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A Multi-Flow Information Flow Tracking Approach for Proving
Quantitative Hardware Security Properties
Yu Tai, Wei Hu , Lu Zhang, Dejun Mu, and Ryan Kastner
Abstract: Information Flow Tracking (IFT) is an established formal method for proving security properties related
to conﬁdentiality, integrity, and isolation. It has seen promise in identifying security vulnerabilities resulting from
design ﬂaws, timing channels, and hardware Trojans for secure hardware design. However, existing IFT methods
tend to take a qualitative approach and only enforce binary security properties, requiring strict non-interference
for the properties to hold while real systems usually allow a small amount of information ﬂows to enable desirable
interactions. Consequently, existing methods are inadequate for reasoning about quantitative security properties or
measuring the security of a design in order to assess the severity of a security vulnerability. In this work, we propose
two multi-ﬂow solutions — multiple veriﬁcations for replicating existing IFT model and multi-ﬂow IFT method. The
proposed multi-ﬂow IFT method provides more insight into simultaneous information ﬂow behaviors and allows for
proof of quantitative information ﬂow security properties, such as diffusion, randomization, and boundaries on the
amount of simultaneous information ﬂows. Experimental results show that our method can be used to prove a new
type of information ﬂow security property with veriﬁcation performance beneﬁts.
Key words: hardware security; Information Flow Tracking (IFT); multi-ﬂow IFT; security property

1

Introduction

Over the past decade, numerous security attacks have
been targeting the underlying hardware of computing
systems by exploiting the security vulnerabilities which
remain undetected at the design and fabrication stages.
Despite the growing security threats, the current
hardware design ﬂow does not take into account security
properties and hence guaranteeing such properties
remains an open problem in most real world scenarios or
still heavily relies on code review. The ever increasing
complexity of digital hardware design has made manual
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inspection for security ﬂaws almost infeasible, while
the distributed nature of the hardware supply chain
has raised the possibility of the existence of malicious
vulnerabilities intended by an untrusted party. Although
various tools have been developed for functional testing
and veriﬁcation over the past decade, there is a huge
demand for alike tools designated to detect and debug
security vulnerabilities.
Information Flow Tracking (IFT) techniques have
been widely investigated to create new secure hardware
design tools for detecting security defects or enforcing
security policies, such as non-interference[1] . Such tools
mainly consist of two elements: a security lattice for
deﬁning the allowed ﬂows among different security
classiﬁcations, and a model for tracking data with
security labels indicated by the lattice. The security
lattice can establish policies, such as restricting the ﬂow
of sensitive information to publicly accessible locations
or the unauthorized modiﬁcation of trusted memory.
The IFT model then deﬁnes how data with different
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security labels propagate through the circuit and hence
can be used to prove isolation or detect harmful ﬂows
of information. IFT methods have been deployed at
various abstraction levels of digital hardware designs,
including the architecture[2] , register transfer[3, 4] , and
gate level[5–7] . However, existing IFT methods typically
take a qualitative approach and only provide a binary
answer (yes or no) to security. As an example, it may
indicate two different Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA)
implementations both leak the key through a timing
channel, but cannot tell which one leaks more (or less
secure).
The lack of effective tool support for hardware security
calls for the study of more convoluted security properties,
such as quantiﬁed metrics and comparative analysis. For
example, existing IFT methods can easily detect a ﬂow
from the secret key to the ciphertext, while none of them
can quantify the number of information ﬂows or indicate
whether the ﬂow is severe enough to allow recovering
the key. This requires a ﬁner grained measurement and
assessment of information ﬂows. Shannon[8] pioneered
in the notion of information theory, which provides
the mathematical foundation for measuring security.
Statistical and information theoretical metrics, such
as variance, entropy, and mutual information have
been employed for quantifying security, such as
attackability, randomness, and information leakage[9–11] .
These theories are also employed to analyze side
channel measurements, such as timing delay and power
consumption to quantify the amount of leakage[12] or
to evaluate side-channel leakage[13] . However, these
quantitative metrics are usually estimated from discrete
data samples collected from functional veriﬁcation. They
cannot be used for formal proof of quantitative security
properties, e.g., tight boundaries on the amount of
information ﬂows.
In this work, we demonstrate a new hardware
IFT technique that can simultaneously track multiple
ﬂows of information by deﬁning multi-bit security
labels, designing novel label propagation rules, and
deriving multi-ﬂow IFT models. We show how this
technique can be used to analyze a new type of
security property, quantify the ﬂow of information in
hardware designs, and search for attack vectors that
can cause a security property violation and pinpoint
design ﬂaws. Speciﬁcally, this paper makes the following
contributions.
 Proposing two multi-ﬂow IFT solutions for
measuring simultaneous information ﬂows;

 Providing a method for testing and formal
veriﬁcation of quantitative information ﬂow security
properties;
 Providing a technique for searching for attack
vectors and identifying the source of information ﬂows;
 Presenting experimental results to demonstrate
the veriﬁcation performance beneﬁts of the proposed
technique in proving quantitative security properties.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
We brieﬂy review related work in Section 2. Section
3 discusses about different types of information ﬂow
security properties and motivates for multi-ﬂow IFT
methods. In Section 4, we propose two different
approaches for multi-ﬂow tracking and a method for
verifying multi-ﬂow security properties. Section 5
presents security veriﬁcation and performance evaluation
results. We conclude the paper in Section 6.

2

Related Work

Hardware IFT techniques have been used to enforce
information ﬂow security properties related to
conﬁdentiality, integrity, and isolation for secure
hardware design[3–5] .
Gate Level Information Flow Tracking (GLIFT) is
a ﬁne grained IFT technique that allows for precise
measurement of all logical ﬂows through Boolean gates.
GLIFT has been employed to identify and eliminate
timing channels in standard bus interfaces[14] , prove
isolation of IP blocks in SoC systems[15] , craft veriﬁably
information ﬂow secure architectures[16] , investigate
timing-based security violations[7] , and detect a certain
class of hardware Trojans[17] . Despite of the success of
GLIFT, researchers move to a higher level of abstraction
to accelerate security veriﬁcation for better performance,
which is a typical tradeoff in hardware design.
Several IFT methods targeting the Register Transfer
Level (RTL) have been introduced over the past few
years. Caisson[18] is a novel Hardware Description
Language (HDL) with a static type system dedicated
to security analysis. Using Caisson, the designer is
required to deﬁne a security label for each variable,
which is then veriﬁed by the type system. Sapper[19]
improves upon Caisson by designing a dynamic type
system that allows the designer to either track the ﬂow
of information or enforce certain policies. However,
Sapper and Caisson are both ﬁnite state-based languages
which make their adaptation in the general hardware
design ﬂow intricate. Furthermore, the label propagation
rules employed in these methods are overly conservative
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and overestimate the actual ﬂow. SecVerilog[3] allows
the designer to describe his/her own label propagation
rules for different operations through the deﬁnition of
dependable and mutable type functions, which can be
veriﬁed by the type system. Hence, the designer is
responsible for labeling data values and deﬁning the
tracking rules, an arduous task that preferably would be
automated. Another IFT method at the RTL augments
additional Coq semantic model for Verilog to track and
prove the secrecy of internal sensitive data[20] . A novel
code-space randomization scheme has been presented
to defense against code reuse attacks that can hijack the
control information ﬂow of the victim application[21] .
RTLIFT[4] allows for automatically generating the IFT
logic using precise ﬂow tracking rules. The RTLIFT
logic can be analyzed by the available EDA tools,
eliminating the need for designing a new type system. A
property speciﬁc approach for information ﬂow security
was proposed to accelerate security veriﬁcation and
restrict potential security violations to quickly pinpoint
hardware security vulnerabilities[22] .
In all these previous work, a binary answer (yes or no)
is provided regarding the ﬂow of information between
different design elements, which in turn restricts the
capabilities of these methods. A binary answer cannot
be used for assessing the severity of the information ﬂow,
e.g., the amount of leakage or performing comparative
security analysis, e.g., if one implementation leaks more
information than another.
Quantitative information ﬂow analysis provides a
method to ascertain the security of a system in a
ﬁner granularity. Gray III[10] formalized quantitatively
an applied ﬂow model that relates non-interference
to the maximum rate of ﬂow between variables.
Clark et al.[9] restricted the leaked information using
different information theoretic measures. Heusser
and Malacaria[11] introduced quantitative information
analysis for C code and show the information leakage
vulnerabilities in the Linux Kernel. Mao et al.[12]
employed information theoretic measures to quantify the
amount of timing information ﬂow that can be exacted
from runtime measurements of cryptographic hardware.
However, these methods are all based on the estimation
of statistical or information theoretic parameters using
discrete data samples from functional veriﬁcation. None
of them takes a formal approach that allows for formal
proof of security properties.
In this work, we enhance hardware IFT methods to
track multiple ﬂows simultaneously by deﬁning multi-
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bit security labels and constructing multi-ﬂow IFT
models, which will allow understanding simultaneous
information ﬂow behaviors and analyzing a new type of
security properties.

3

Information Flow Security Properties

Information ﬂow security properties can be categorized
into qualitative and quantitative.
3.1

Qualitative information ﬂow security
properties

Non-interference is a strong qualitative security property
for enforcing data conﬁdentiality and integrity. It
states that high information should never ﬂow to a
low portion of the design. For example, consider a
cryptographic core where the key should never ﬂow to
the ciphertext ready signal. We can label the key as
high and check if the ready signal is always low. The
following describes such a security property.
set key = high,
set others = low,
assert ready == low.

Non-interference is a very strict qualitative security
property. Most existing IFT methods are built upon the
non-interference model. These methods are effective
for enforcing security properties such as there is either
never or always a ﬂow. They will indicate a potential
security threat whenever an unintended information ﬂow
is detected.
However, practical systems sometimes allow a small
amount of information ﬂow to enable interactions
between different design components. Qualitative
information ﬂow security properties cannot be used
to enforce scenarios where information is allowed to
ﬂow but only in a secure manner. Consider a password
checker that takes a 64-bit phrase and outputs logical 1
when the input is the correct password otherwise logical
0. A qualitative information ﬂow security property will
indicate a security violation due to the ﬂow from the
password to the status output. However, it is perfectly
ﬁne to allow such a small amount of information ﬂow.
3.2

Quantitative information ﬂow security
properties

Diffusion, confusion, and randomization represent three
important security properties for assessing the security
of information ﬂows.
Diffusion is a quantitative security property that can
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be veriﬁed using a Satisﬁability Modulo Theories (SMT)
solver. It requires that if we change a single bit of
the message, statistically half of the ciphertext bits
should ﬂip. In the following, we mark the w-th bit of
the message as high and check if at least half of the
ciphertext bits will be high, where L is the length of
the ciphertext in bits and cipher t is the security label of
the ciphertext.
set message[w] = high,
set others = low,
P
assert .cipher tŒj  DD high/ > L=2, j 2 Œ0; L  1.

Confusion is another important quantitative security
property which requires that each ciphertext bit should
depend on several parts of the key. Assume that we have
a security label * i that can track the information ﬂows
from each individual key bit, the following example
security property requires that at least N key bits should
ﬂow to every single bit of the ciphertext. This can be
formalized as Eq. (1) and checked using an SMT solver,
9 message 2 f0; 1gL ; 8 key 2 f0; 1gL ;
X
cipher iŒj  > N; j 2 Œ0; L  1
(1)
Randomization is a quantitative security property
similar to confusion, which can be used to evaluate the
strength of a masking mechanism. It requires that a
critical variable is at least protected by N bits of the
random number. Assume that we have a security label
* i that can track the information ﬂows from every single
bit of the random number, the following example security
property requires that at least N bits of the random
number should ﬂow to each bit of var,
9 message; 2 f0; 1gL ; 8 rand 2 f0; 1gL ;
X
var i Œj  > N; j 2 Œ0; L  1
(2)
In the following, we will propose two multi-ﬂow IFT
approaches for simultaneously tracking the information
ﬂows from each individual bit of a variable and enforcing
quantitative information ﬂow security properties.

4
4.1

Multi-Flow IFT Approaches
Multi-ﬂow information ﬂow tracking

Existing hardware IFT models only allow a data object to
be associated with a single security class at any time. The
change in its security classiﬁcation precisely indicates
a ﬂow between the old and updated security classes.
However, these models are inadequate in modeling
simultaneous information ﬂow scenarios among multiple
security classes.

As an example, cryptographic cores usually introduce
confusion and diffusion to increase security. This
requires that all secret data bits are fully and evenly
mixed. It is usually desirable that all bits of the secret
key should ﬂow to all bits of the ciphertext. In another
case, ideally all bits of the random number should protect
(ﬂow to) some critical variable in order to guarantee the
strength of a masking mechanism. In such cases, we
need a multi-ﬂow IFT model that can track the ﬂow
of multiple data bits simultaneously. This model can
precisely measure how many bits are affecting (ﬂowing
to) a target bit at the same time and allow quantifying the
amount of information ﬂow. We present two different
solutions for multi-ﬂow IFT in Sections 4.2 and 4.3.
4.2

Label encoding and mapping

To track multiple information ﬂows simultaneously,
we need to expand the security label used by existing
hardware IFT methods to track the propagation of every
single input data bit. This requires linear scale expansion
in label width. After the expansion, a simple twolevel security lattice low  high will be adequate for
security classiﬁcation. Thus, there still can be signiﬁcant
beneﬁts in scalability as compared to introducing a
complex security lattice, which will result in exponential
scale increase in complexity of the IFT model.
For a better understanding of the multi-ﬂow security
label, consider a four-bit signal A. Table 1 shows the
security labels under different IFT models. Under the
two-level hardware IFT method, we have the taint
labels A t Œw 2 f0; 1g, where 0  w  3. Thus, A t is
four-bit wide. The multi-level IFT method allows a
ﬁner classiﬁcation of security labels. Each individual
bit in A can take a different label, we have A t Œw 2
f00; 01; 10; 11g, which can be encoded with two binary
bits. Therefore, A t is eight-bit wide for the multi-level
IFT method. By comparison, the multi-ﬂow IFT method
uses one-hot encoding in order to track the ﬂow of
individual bits. The taint labels Ai Œw 2 f0000; 0001;
0010; 0100; 1000g (we use a different notation Ai here).
Here, 0000 corresponds to the case when A t Œw D 0.
The multi-ﬂow model requires 16 bits for security labels.
Now we deﬁne a rule for mapping the security labels
Table 1 Encoding methods for security labels under
different IFT models.
Model Signal
Encoding code
Label width
Two-level A t Œw
0, 1
1 bit
00, 01, 10, 11
2 bits
Multi-level A t Œw
4 bits
Multi-ﬂow Ai Œw 0000, 0001, 0010, 0100, 1000
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to multi-ﬂow. Given an n-bit signal B, we need nbit security labels in one-hot encoding for multi-ﬂow
tacking. Let B t and Bi be the security labels for existing
two-level and multi-ﬂow IFT methods, respectively.
Equation (3) shows a possible method to encode the
multi-ﬂow security labels, where << is the left shift
operator.
(
0000;
when B t Œw D 0I
(3)
Bi Œw D
0001 << w; when B t Œw D 1
4.3

simply takes the logic OR of all input multi-ﬂow labels
as the output label. This doubtlessly will track the ﬂow
of all input variables simultaneously. However, it can be
overly conservative since it does not take into account
the effect of logic values in label propagation. As a
simple example, when A is (low, 0) and B is high,
existing hardware IFT model given in Eq. (4) indicates
there is no ﬂow of high information (i.e., O t D low).
Thus, the multi-ﬂow label should be all zeros. However,
the multi-ﬂow model shown in Fig. 1b will still indicate
a high information ﬂow in this case.
Another possible solution for tracking multiple bits
is to replicate an existing hardware IFT model (e.g.,
GLIFT or RTLIFT) and then run multiple veriﬁcations
for the models replicated as shown in Fig. 1c. However,
this will introduce additional veriﬁcation performance
overheads.
To eliminate such false positives and avoid running
multiple veriﬁcations, we propose a technique to reset
the multi-ﬂow label when there is no high ﬂow.
Speciﬁcally, when the precise hardware IFT model (e.g.,
GLIFT or RTLIFT) indicates there is no high ﬂow, we
downgrade the multi-ﬂow label to all zeros, i.e., low.
Figure 1d shows such a technique.
Table 2 shows the number of information ﬂows for
outputs of the IWLS alu2 benchmark measured using
the multi-ﬂow tracking models shown in Figs. 1b and 1d,

Multi-ﬂow IFT model

Hardware IFT models deﬁne the rules for label
propagation. These models can precisely measure the
existence of a ﬂow by considering the effect of values in
label propagation. Take the two-input AND gate (AND2) as an example. Let A; B, and O be its inputs and
output, respectively. Use A t ; B t , and O t to denote their
security labels under two-level IFT methods. The precise
label propagation policy for AND-2 can be formalized
as Eq. (4),
Ot D A  Bt C B  At C At  Bt
(4)
Equation (4) indicates that when A is logical 1 and
B is high, or B is logical 1 and A is high, or both A
and B are high, the output will be high. It models if
there is any high information ﬂow from either A or B
to the output. However, when there is indeed a ﬂow, it
does not tell which input pattern caused the output to
be high. Nor does it reveal how many high inputs
ﬂow to the output at the same time. Understanding the
source of a harmful information ﬂow can be beneﬁcial
for pinpointing a security vulnerability. To do this, we
need a label propagation policy that tracks the ﬂows of
information from multiple variables simultaneously.
Existing work[23] typically tracks the ﬂow of multiple
variables using an imprecise model as shown in Fig. 1b.
Here, A and B are the original inputs of AND-2; Ai , Bi ,
and Oi are the multi-ﬂow security labels. This method

Table 2 Number of information ﬂow for outputs of the
IWLS alu2 benchmark measured using imprecise and precise
multi-ﬂow tracking logic.
Output
Imprecise
Precise
False positive (%)
k
4 194 296
4 053 784
3.47
l
5 242 870
4 792 260
9.40
m
1 048 574
1 048 574
0.00
n
1 048 574
786 430
33.33
o
5 242 870
3 984 738
31.57
p
2 097 148
1 835 004
14.29
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Fig. 1 Multi-ﬂow tracking logic for AND-2. (a) Two-input AND gate. (b) Conservative multi-ﬂow tracking logic for AND-2. (c)
Multi-ﬂow tracking logic through IFT model replication. (d) Precise multi-ﬂow tracking logic for AND-2.
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4.4

Multi-ﬂow tracking logic generation

To understand multi-ﬂow behaviors of hardware designs,
the ﬁrst step is to create multi-ﬂow tracking logic for
digital circuits. This can be done in a constructive
manner similar to technology mapping. We ﬁrst
synthesize the hardware design into design netlist
consisted of a small set of logic primitives (e.g.,
AND, OR, and Invertor). Deriving multi-ﬂow tracking
logic for smaller primitives has signiﬁcantly lower
complexity. With the multi-ﬂow tracking logic for the
logic primitives, we can then discretely map the primitive
gates in the design netlist to its corresponding multi-ﬂow
tracking logic. Using this constructive approach, multiﬂow tracking logic for large hardware design can be
generated in polynomial time. Figure 2 shows such a
constructive method.

5

Experimental Results

In this section, we present experimental results. In
Section 5.1, we perform simulation analysis to show
that multi-ﬂow IFT model reveals the confusion
introduced by S-Box. We perform veriﬁcation analysis
to demonstrate how multi-ﬂow IFT models simultaneous
information ﬂow behaviors while existing hardware IFT
methods cannot in Section 5.2. We perform comparison
Hardware
Design

Tech
library

/RJLF
V\QWKHVLV

7HFK
PDSSLQJ

'HULYH

Design
netlist

of security veriﬁcation performance across different IFT
models in Section 5.3.
5.1

Simulation analysis

We perform simulation analysis using the S-Box
in the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) cipher.
The function under test can be described as O D
sbox.key XOR mes/, where key is a key byte, mes is a
message byte, and sbox is the substitute bytes operation
in AES.
We mark all eight bits of key as high and encode their
multi-ﬂow security labels using the method introduced
in Section 4.2. All bits of mes are labeled as low and
thus their multi-ﬂow labels are all zeros. We use linear
feedback shift register to generate random vectors as the
message and observe the multi-ﬂow labels of the signals
in the S-Box model. Figure 3 shows the percentage of
signals affected by different number of key bits.
From Fig. 3, the signals affected by no more than
two key bits sum up to about 5%. About 8% signals are
affected by three key bits. Over 85% signals are affected
by at least four key bits, where more than 25% signals are
affected by all eight key bits. Our simulation test based
upon the multi-ﬂow IFT model reveals the confusion
introduced by S-Box, which could not be shown using
existing hardware IFT methods.
5.2

Security veriﬁcation analysis

We perform security veriﬁcation analysis using an AES
core of Differential Power Analysis (DPA) contest from
dpacontest.org. Figure 4 shows the architecture of the
AES design.
   
HIIHFWHG 

respectively. k; l; m; n; o; and p are the outputs of the
IWLS alu2 benchmark. We can see that the percentage
of false positives for the imprecise tracking logic shown
in Fig. 1b can be over 30% percent for certain outputs.
Unlike existing hardware IFT methods, where false
positives are safe, false positives in multi-ﬂow tracking
may indicate non-existent confusion or diffusion and
thus allow an insecure design to be veriﬁed as secure.
To derive the multi-ﬂow tracking logic for other
Boolean gates, we only need to replace the precise
hardware IFT logic for AND-2 in the dotted rectangle
in Fig. 1d with the corresponding IFT logic for that
gate. The multi-ﬂow tracking logic for an invertor will
automatically simplify to a direct connection. This is
because an invertor always propagates the security label
as it is.























     

Multi-flow
IFT logic

Fig. 2 Constructive method for multi-ﬂow tracking logic
generation.



Fig. 3 Percentage of signals affected by different number
of key bits from random simulation of AES S-Box using the
multi-ﬂow IFT model.
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Fig. 4

AES core from DPA contest.
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We mark the lowest 16 bits of the key as high, i.e.,
key t D 128’hFFFF. We then use the label encoding and
mapping method introduced in Section 4.2 to determine
the multi-ﬂow labels for the corresponding key bits.
These would be from 16’h0001 to 16’h8000 using
our encoding. We perform security veriﬁcation using
both the GLIFT and multi-ﬂow IFT models. We check
the following security properties, where cipher t Œw
(w 2 Œ0; 15) is the taint label for the ciphertext under
the GLIFT model while cipher iŒw is the multi-ﬂow
label,
assert cipher t Œw == high,
P
assert cipher iŒw DD 16:

Veriﬁcation results using GLIFT show that the security
property always holds, i.e., the ciphertext is always
high. However, results indicate that the security
property for multi-ﬂow IFT can be violated. After a
closer check of the AES design, we ﬁnd the core contains
a security ﬂaw in that it feeds the key xor message
and intermediate encryption results to the cipher output.
These intermediate results leak a signiﬁcant amount
of information about the key. For example, when the
message bits are all zeros, the key will be observed at
the cipher output directly.
We further perform security veriﬁcation
analysis using a hardware Trojan design that
is activated when the plaintext message is
128’h00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF to
leak the key. Figure 5 shows the architecture of the
Trojan design.
Similarly, We mark the lowest 8 bits of the key as
high, i.e., key t D 128’hFF and also assign multiﬂow labels for the corresponding key bits, which would
be from 8’h01 to 8’h80 under our encoding. We
perform security veriﬁcation using both the GLIFT and
multi-ﬂow IFT models to check the security properties,
where cipher t Œw (w 2 Œ0; 7) is the taint label for the
ciphertext under the GLIFT model while cipher i Œw is
the multi-ﬂow label,
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assert cipher tŒw == high,
P
assert cipher i Œw DD 8:

Veriﬁcation results using GLIFT show that
the security property always holds, i.e., the
ciphertext is always high. However, results
indicate that the security property for multi-ﬂow
IFT can be violated when the plaintext message is
128’h00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF, i.e.,
when the Trojan is triggered.
From the veriﬁcation results, the multi-ﬂow method
captures both the security ﬂaw and Trojan where GLIFT
cannot. This is because the multi-ﬂow method can be
used to formally verify quantitative security properties
while GLIFT only enforces qualitative ones.
5.3

Veriﬁcation performance analysis

We ﬁrst compare the veriﬁcation time of GLIFT and
multi-ﬂow IFT models using RSA cores of different key
sizes. We use these two IFT models to verify the property
that key bits do not ﬂow to the ciphertext ready signal.
For the GLIFT model, we mark one key bit as high and
check if the ready signal will be high when encryption
completes. For the multi-ﬂow model, we mark eight key
bits as high and check if the multi-ﬂow label of ready
will be 8’hFF. Figure 6 shows the veriﬁcation time for
different cores.
From Fig. 6, the veriﬁcation time for both methods
will grow with the size of RSA cores. Although the
multi-ﬂow method requires more time for running a
single security veriﬁcation, it accounts for eight key
bits in a single run. The GLIFT method will need to
run multiple similar veriﬁcations with different security
constraints, which would lead to signiﬁcantly higher
performance overheads. Thus, the multi-ﬂow model may
see beneﬁts in performance when verifying quantitative
security properties.
We then use several cryptographic functions and trustHUB benchmarks[24] for security veriﬁcation analysis to
7
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Multi-flow

GLIFT * 8

5
4
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1
0
RSA16

Fig. 5 Hardware Trojan design that is activated when a
speciﬁc plaintext is observed.

RSA32

RSA48

RSA64

RSA80

RSA96

RSA112

RSA128

Fig. 6 Veriﬁcation time for both GLIFT and multi-ﬂow IFT
models using RSA cores of different key sizes.
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compare their performance and ability to capture harmful
information ﬂows. There are some slight differences in
the types of security properties that are proved on these
two models. Take the BasicRSA design for example, we
label a signal key bit and would like to check where
this key bit will ﬂow to using the GLIFT model; we
label eight key bits and track their propagation to each
ciphertext bit using the multi-ﬂow model. Table 3 gives
the veriﬁcation reports from Questa Formal.
From Table 3, the multi-ﬂow model tends to take
longer veriﬁcation time. However, it still can be
beneﬁcial because this model tracks multiple ﬂows
during each proof. GLIFTN means it takes N times
of GLIFT proofs. Consider the AES-DPA example, it
takes the GLIFT model 42 s to prove where a single
key bit can ﬂow to. It is important to note that we
cannot label multiple key bits for the GLIFT model
in this proof. Otherwise, we will not be able to tell
which key bit actually propagates to a speciﬁc ciphertext
bit. To understand the propagation of all the key bits,
we need to label a different key bit each time and run
multiple veriﬁcations under different constraints. For
the entire 128-bit key, this will require 128 proofs,
which result in a total veriﬁcation time of 42  128 D
5376 s. By comparison, the multi-ﬂow method can
model simultaneous information ﬂow behaviors. We
can monitor the propagation of eight key bits in 67 s.
Understanding the propagation of all key bits requires
running 16 proofs, which yields to a total proof time of
67  16 = 1072 s.
It is important to notice that for the presentcipher and
RSA-T300 benchmarks, the GLIFT method indicates
the key bits always ﬂow to all ciphertext bits while the
multi-ﬂow IFT method says no. Here, the multi-ﬂow IFT
method more precisely captures the key leakage through

intermediate encryption result in present cipher and also
the leakage via a hardware Trojan in the RSA-T300
design.
As demonstrated by our tests, the multi-ﬂow IFT
method can be more complex than GLIFT. However,
it can be used to prove quantiﬁed security properties,
such as diffusion and confusion. By comparison, the
GLIFT and multi-level models can be more efﬁcient in
proving qualitative security properties, e.g., no key bit
should ﬂow to a given output.

6

Conclusion

In this paper, we propose a multi-ﬂow IFT method for
understanding the simultaneous ﬂows of information
through hardware designs. The proposed method
provides a ﬁner insight into the simultaneous information
ﬂow behaviors and allows verifying a wider range
of security properties with potential veriﬁcation
performance beneﬁts. The multi-ﬂow method detects
both unintentional design ﬂaws and malicious hardware
Trojans where qualitative IFT method cannot through
formal veriﬁcation of quantitative security properties.
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